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Introduction 
Price and production uncertainty contribute the two main sources of risk to a crop 
producer’s farming income. Market strategies consider futures and options as the only risk 
management instruments to protect farmers from undesired low farm income resulting from 
lower crop prices at harvest. But U.S. crop producers, in addition to futures and options, have 
access to two additional types of government-supported means to manage the risk of low farm 
income: government payment programs and subsidized federal crop insurance plans.  
By limiting income risk faced by farmers, three major government payment programs – 
direct payments (DP), loan deficiency payments (LDP), and counter cyclical payments (CCP) – 
legislated in the current farm bill, the Food Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act, provide 
substantial income support to U.S. crop farmers. In 2005, these three government payments 
totaled over $14.3 billion, which accounts for almost 20% of the 73.8 billion net farm income of 
that year
1. For crop farmers, the percentage of these payments in net farm income would be even 
higher, because they receive the bulk of these payments but contribute to the net farm income 
together with livestock farmers. 
In the past decade, subsidized federal crop insurance plans have become a promising 
means for U.S. crop farmers to manage price and production risk, evidenced by the fact that net 
insured acres, excluding acres under the free catastrophic insurance, have increased from about 
105 million acres in 1995 crop year to 158 million acres in 2000 crop year and to over 217 
million acres in 2005. Meanwhile, the premium subsidy has increased from $436 million in 1995 
                                                 
1 Data source: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmincome/data/GP_T6.htm  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmincome/data/va_t1.htm 
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to $686 million in 2000 and to over $2 billion in 2005
2. Such supports from the U.S. government 
are expected to reduce the probability of sharp drops in crop income for participating farmers 
and consequently affect the risk management behaviors of crop farmers.  
The effects of government-oriented risk management tools on the use of financial market 
risk management tools, such as futures and options, concern researchers for several reasons. First, 
such effects reveal the distortion of government intervention on private market decisions. Second, 
the large amount of government payments and federal insurance subsidies may lead to 
substantive influence on the use of futures and options, even if the marginal effects are trivial. 
Third, acknowledgement of such effects has practical implications to crop farmers, because they 
could adjust their portfolios of risk management tools accordingly. Fourth, policy makers may be 
interested in such evaluations, which offer insights into the relative risk management 
effectiveness of various government payments and insurance policies.  
Although understanding the impacts of government payment programs and federal crop 
insurance plans on the use of futures and options would benefit both crop farmers and policy 
makers, very few studies examine such effects
3. Among studies in the literature that examine 
such issues, the expected utility (EU) hedge model, which assumes that crop farmers hedge with 
futures and options to maximize expected utility, appears to be the only method used (Poitras, 
1993; Hanson et al. 1999; Coble et al. 2000, 2004; Mahul 2003; Wang et al. 2004).  
By making assumptions on the utility function and on the distribution of random 
variables, such as harvest-time yield, spot price, and futures price, optimal hedge ratios can be 
found numerically. Stochastic simulation and numerical optimization are normally used instead 
                                                 
2 Data from Summary of Business Report, Federal crop insurance Corp, RMA, USDA  
3 The special issue of European Review of Agricultural Economics in September 2004 claim 
producer hedging and insurance decisions under multiple uncertainties as a new issue about 
individual behavior towards risk.   3 
of analytically-derived optimal solutions, because government payments, crop insurance, and 
options in the risk management portfolio censor the portfolio at multiple points. Such kinks in 
payoffs restrict the differentiability required for analytical derivation (Coble et al., 2000). While 
the assumptions on the yield and prices distributions can be tested using historical data, the 
utility function is usually subjectively determined, since it requires special experiments to 
delineate any decision maker’s utility function (Chavas, 2004). However, because the true utility 
function is not known, results obtained from a particular utility function may be misleading and 
lack generality (Sakong et al., 1993). 
When examining the effects of government payments and/or insurance on hedging, most 
of the previous works consider the effects on futures only, disregarding the fact that put options 
may be used together with futures to achieve optimal hedging. Should options be used together 
with futures by crop farmers at the planting time, when they attempt to hedge price risk to their 
crop at harvest? A few studies have suggested that options have a distinct role in the risk 
management portfolio under price and yield uncertainty or when cash prices received by farmers 
are truncated (Sakong et al., 1992; Moshini and Lapan, 1995; Hanson et al., 1999). Thus, futures 
and options should be considered together as available risk management instruments.  
To evaluate the effects of government payments and insurance on optimal hedge ratios in 
futures and options, harvest-time values of several variables, including farm-level yield, spot 
price, futures price and market year average price, must be simulated. Prior studies typically 
simulate such harvest-time realizations based on two key assumptions: 1) these random variables 
have joint normal distribution, or at least they can be transformed to be joint-normally distributed; 
2) farm-level yield has the same distribution as county-level yield, except for having a larger 
variance. The problem with the joint normality assumption is that it is too restrictive, if there is   4 
no hypothesis test result to support such an assumption. Also, because county-level yield has a 
longer record than farm-level yield, such an assumption enables researchers to get more reliable 
estimates regarding yield distribution and its relationship with other price variables by using 
county yields rather than farm-level yield data. However, such assumptions may not be 
appropriate in that the constant variance assumption for farm-level yield contradicts the variance 
pattern reflected in historical yield data. Figure 1 shows that the variance of farm-level yields is 
not constant. Instead, the variance varies with the level of county yields.  
The objective of this study, then, is to apply a downside risk management framework, the 
second-order lower partial moment (LPM2) hedge model to investigate the effects of government 
payment programs (LDP and CCP) and two federal crop insurance plans, Actual Production 
History (APH) and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), on the optimal use of risk management tools 
in the financial market, such as futures and options. The motivation of applying a LPM2 hedge 
model rather than the EU hedge model is to avoid subjectivity that may be introduced by any 
particular utility function used in the EU hedge model. In addition, the downside risk hedging 
criterion employed by the LPM2 model seems to be more relevant than the expected utility 
approach when government payments and insurance are considered in the hedge portfolio. Since 
the ultimate goal of government payment and insurance programs is to protect crop farmers from 
receiving low farm incomes, one can assume that downside risk to crop income is also the 
concern of farmers, who lobby for these programs. 
Literature Review 
The effects of federal crop insurance plans and government payments programs on 
hedging under the current or previous farm bills have been examined under the expected utility 
(EU) hedge model by a number of studies (Poitras, 1993; Hanson et al. 1999; Coble et al. 2000,   5 
2004; Mahul 2003; Wang et al. 2004). Most of these studies investigated the effects of 
government payments and insurance on the use of futures only, although it has been proven by 
Sakong et al. (1993) that the coexistence of both price and production risk induces the use of 
futures and options together in the optimal hedge.  
Poitras (1993) pointed out that when crop producers face both price and production 
uncertainty, the analysis of the farmer’s hedging problem should not ignore the possibility of 
using crop insurance. While attempting to obtain the analytical effects of crop insurance on 
futures hedge, Poitras noted that the impact of the crop yield or revenue insurance on the futures 
hedge is not clear-cut, due to a number of potential offsetting effects. Coble et al. (2000) 
examined the impacts of four insurance contracts on futures or options hedging separately, their 
finding that adding APH into the risk management portfolio always increases the futures hedge 
ratio regardless of the regional difference, while the effects of CRC on hedging demand for 
futures or put options are mixed.  
Mahul (2003), examining the effects of crop yield and revenue insurance on hedge ratios 
when both futures and options (using the straddle strategy) are in the portfolio, found the 
inclusion of APH in the portfolio stimulates the sale of futures but has little effect on straddles. 
CRC decreases the short positions in futures and shows mixed effects on the use of straddles.  
Coble et al. (2004) found that LDP decreases futures hedging by examining hedge ratios 
in futures from an EU hedge model with the assumption of joint normality for the transformed 
county yields and futures prices and the assumption that farm-level yields have a constant 
variance from year to year. Wang et al. (2004) analyzed the effects of LDP and CCP on the 
optimal hedge in futures by applying an EU hedge model and found that LDP substitutes the use 
of futures. CCP substitutes futures as long as transaction costs in futures market are low enough   6 
so that the futures hedge ratio is still greater than zero before CCP takes effect. Similar to the 
study by Coble et al. (2004), Wang et al. assumed constant variance of the farm-level yield and 
joint normality for the county yield and transformed futures price in the simulation. 
LPM2 Hedge Model 
 An LPM2 hedge model has as its objective the minimization of the second-order lower 
partial moment. LPM2 is a member of the set of lower partial moment risk measures. LPM 
downside risk measures originate in the investment literature. Roy (1952) proposed to apply a 
safety-first rule to make an investment decision under uncertainty. Bawa (1978) generalized 
Roy’s downside risk measure by constructing a set of downside risk measures, called lower 
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Roy’s down-side risk measure. If n is a positive integer, LPMn represents the probability-
weighted n
th-power of the shortfall below a target payoffp . 
The theoretical justification of the LPM criterion in determining an optimal investment 
portfolio resides in the relationship between LPM risk measures and stochastic dominance. Both 
Fishburn (1977) and Bawa (1978) noted that LPMn criterion are consistent with (n+1)
th order 
stochastic dominance rule for n = 0, 1, 2. That is:  
If X FSD Y, then  ) ( ) ( 0 0 Y LPM X LPM £ for all levels of the target payoff;  
If X SSD Y, then  ) ( ) ( 1 1 Y LPM X LPM £  for all target payoffs;  
If X TSD Y, then ) ( ) ( 2 2 Y LPM X LPM £  for all target payoffs. 
Because (n+1)
th order stochastic dominance and the expected utility criterion result in the 
same ranking for all the utility functions with  0 ) 1 (
) ( £ -
k kU  (k = 1, 2, …, n) (Yamai and 
Yoshiba, 2002; pp.116-117 of Levy, 1998, for the proof), LPMn criterion is also consistent with   7 
the expected utility criterion if the expected utility criterion results in the same ranking across all 
the utility functions U satisfying  0 ) 1 (
) ( £ -
k kU  (k = 1, 2, …, n). In particular, LPM2 is consistent 
with the expected utility criterion when the expected utility criterion yields the same ranking for 
all the utility functions with  0 > ¢ U ,  0 < ¢ ¢ U , and  0 > ¢ ¢ ¢ U , of which the usually desired 
decreasing absolute risk aversion utility functions are members (Harlow and Rao, 1989).  
Applications of LPM2 hedge models are primarily discussed in the finance literature 
(Eftekhari, 1998; Lien and Tse, 1998; 2000; Chen et al. 2003), in which prices comprise nearly 
all the uncertainty for the value of the portfolio. Turvey and Nayak (2003) and Mattos and 
Garcia (2005) are two of the few studies that examine the LPM2 hedge ratios for agricultural 
commodities. However, production risk was excluded by both studies.  
Distinguished from any existing LPM2 hedge model, the LPM2 hedge model applied in 
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, where p is the target payoff of the hedged portfolio, 
which is set to the expected payoff of the hedged portfolio in this study.  X h and Z h are the hedge 
ratios for futures and options.  X h (or Z h ) is measured as the ratios of yields hedged with futures 
contracts (or options contracts) to the expected farm yield. Positive (negative) X h implies to sell 
(buy) futures contracts, while positive (negative)  Z h  implies buying (selling) put options 
contracts.  
With different combinations of futures, options, government payments, and crop 
insurance in the portfolio, p  has different expressions. For example, assume there are no 
insurance plans and government payments available to the representative farmer, and the 
representative farmer is assumed to use only futures and options to manage risk. Then the net   8 
value of the hedge portfolio at harvest is 
) ( ] ) 0 , [max( ) ( 1 1 0 Ey C Ey v k f h Ey f f h py Z Z X - - - + - + = p , where  pyis the revenue from 
selling the crop for cash at harvest,  p is the harvest cash price and  y is the farm yield at harvest. 
0 f and 1 f are the prices of the near-to-harvest futures contract at planting and at harvest, 
respectively. k is the strike price of the put option, and  Z v is the premium that the farmer pays to 
have the put option. Harvest cash price p , harvest farm-level yield  y and futures price at 
harvest 1 f are not known at planting and will be simulated based on historical data. The 
assumption of unbiased futures and options prices will be imposed by simulating 1 f in such a way 
that 0 1 f Ef = and by setting option premium )) 0 , (max( 1 k f E vZ - = . Production cost Cis 
assumed to be determined by the expected farm yield Ey, which is known at planting time. 
Appendix I shows alternative portfolios of futures, options, government payments and crop 
insurance examined by this study. 
Simulation Methods 
Optimal hedging positions of a representative farmer in a county are solved to evaluate 
the effects of government payments and crop insurance on the use of futures and options. The 
representative farmer in a county is synthesized in such a way that, for any year, the mean of the 
yield distribution equals the county yield, but the actual yield could be any actual farm-level 
yield realized in the county. It has been shown that the dispersions of farm-level yield around 
county yield vary from year to year (figures 1). This indicates that the representative farm 
defined above should have variance conditional on the county yield.  
Other assumptions made for the representative producer are as follows. First, the crop 
producer is assumed to make a one-time hedge through the crop year. Second, the representative 
farmer is assumed to have a portfolio composed of income from selling crops at spot market as   9 
well as from four risk management instruments –futures, options on futures, federal crop 
insurance and government payments. To simplify the analysis regarding government payments, 
the representative farmer is assumed to produce a single commodity for which he is qualified to 
receive government payments. Third, the representative farmer makes his/her hedging decision 
at planting time by utilizing information available at that time. Fourth, the hedge decision for 
every acre of the crop planted is assumed to be independent of total acres planted. That is, the 
hedge portfolio based on one acre of the planted crop can be analyzed for simplicity.  
In figure 2, a flowchart illustrates the general steps to simulate the random values of four 
variables, futures price at harvest (f1), harvest local cash price (p), market year average price 
(pMYA) and the representative farm’s yield at harvest (yf), which are necessary in order to solve 
the hedge models. Two important steps in the simulation are first to generate harvest-time futures 
price and county yields with the copula method, and then to simulate farm yields based on the 
generated county yield.  Copula method is used to simulate county yields and prices so that 
yields and prices can have more flexible dependence structures than the multivariate normal 
distribution. The implementation of conditional kernel density approach generates farm yields 
with variance contingent on county yields, which conforms to the pattern showed in historical 
county yields and farm yields. After futures price at harvest is simulated, harvest-time cash price 
and market year average price are generated based on their linear relationships with futures price 
indicated by the historical data. 
In statistics, copula is a function that connects the marginal distributions to the joint 
cumulative distribution (Nelson, 1999). In particular, suppose that H is a joint cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) on R
m with marginal CDFs, F1,…, Fm, then   10 
] 1 , 0 [ ~ ],..., 1 , 0 [ ~ 1 1 Unif F U Unif F U m m = =  and the joint distribution function of  1 U ,…,  m U is a 
copula C such that  
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According to Sklar’s theorem (Nelson, 1999), for any continuous multivariate CDF, there 
is a unique copula; conversely, for any copula, there is a joint distribution with marginal 
distributions of corresponding dimensions. By associating the marginal CDF with the joint CDF, 
copula fully describe the dependence among the variables X1,…, Xm (Chen and Huang) without 
explicitly specifying the joint cumulative functional form.  
The need to model the distribution of harvest-time yields and prices and the distributional 
flexibility associated with the copula method motivate this study to use copula simulation. 
Among the many well-known copulas, two copulas, Gaussian copula and Frank copula, were 
selected to model the dependence between the county yields and the futures prices. The purpose 
of selecting two copulas is to (i) demonstrate that a variety of joint distributions of yields and 
prices can exist other than the bivariate normal and (ii) provide a sensitivity analysis of the 
results.  
Bivariate Gaussian copula takes the form  )) ( ), ( ( ) , (
1 1 v u v u CG
- - F F F = r , where  r F is 
the bivariate normal CDF with the Pearson’s coefficient r , representing the linear correlation 
between the two variables X1 and X2; Fis the normal CDF; u and v are variates from two 
independent Uniform (0, 1) distributions. Frank copula is a one-parameter copula function of the 
form 
1 ) exp(











v u CF ,  0 „ q . When the r in Gaussian copula   11 
and q  in Frank copula are positive (negative), the marginal distributions coupled by the copulas 
are positively (negatively) associated.  
In this study, the two marginal distributions coupled by the Gaussian copula or Frank 
copula are the distribution of county yield 
c y F and the marginal distribution of the logarithm 
difference between the futures prices at harvest and at planting, f d F ln . County-level yields need 
to be simulated because the representative farm’s yields are modeled as conditional on the 
county yields. The marginal distribution of (dlnf) is used here because, on the one hand, this 
differenced variable has a significant negative correlation with county yields, and conversely, it 
can be used to generate harvest-time futures price f1 when the planting-time futures price f0 is 
known. Futures prices have been specified by the lognormal distribution in the literature (Coble 
et al. 2000, 2004; Hauser et al. 2004). Since dlnf ) ln ln ( 0 1 f f - = calculated with historical cotton 
futures data passed several normality tests (Tables 1), this study assumes (dlnf) to be normally 
distributed with mean and variance determined by the historical data. That is, 
f d F ln = ) ˆ , ˆ ( ln ln f d f d s m F . Once planting time futures price f0 is known, harvest futures price can be 
simulated by ) ln exp( 0 1 f d f f ￿ = . Significant dependence between yc and (dlnf) found in 
historical data determines the sign and magnitude of  r  in Gaussian copula andq  in Frank 
copula. However, this study does not assert that these two copulas make the best fits to the 
relationships between the sample yields and prices (For copula selection criteria, see Venter, 
2002). In the agricultural economics literature, yield distributions have been modeled by both 
parametric methods and nonparametric approaches (Ker and Goodwin, 2000; Wang et al. 2004). 
This study applied a nonparametric kernel density approach to estimate the empirical distribution 
of the detrended county yields. In particular, for any
*
c y , the empirical cumulative probability was   12 
estimated by  ￿ ￿
=
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density estimator. ci Y  represents the detrended historical county yields, Kh is defined as 
) / ( ) / 1 ( ) ( h K h Kh ￿ = ￿ , his the bandwidth or smoothing parameter which determines the 
smoothness of the estimated density, and K(
.) is referred to as the kernel. In this study, the 
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bandwidth is determined by the Sheather-Jones plug-in method.  ) ( ˆ *
c y F  was calculated by 
applying Simpson’s rule of numerical integration (Miranda and Fackler, 2002).  
By following the simulation algorithms, 10,000 pairs of (yc, fi) were simulated from the 
Gaussian copula and from Frank copula, respectively. In order to investigate the hedging 
decision under the unbiased futures price assumption, the mean of the simulated futures price 
was adjusted to equal the futures price at planting time (Wang, et al. 2004). Hedging decisions 
under biased futures price will also be examined by enlarging or shrinking the mean of the 
simulated futures by a certain percent. 
Data 
Farm yield data for cotton in Colquitt County from year 1991 to 2000 were obtained from 
RMA of USDA. Farm-level yield data were used to estimate the empirical conditional farm yield 
distribution. County-level yield of cotton in Colquitt County from year 1950 to 2005 were 
collected on the website of the NASS of USDA. County yield data were used to estimate the 
empirical distribution of county yield as well as to estimate the correlation between yield and   13 
futures price
4. Daily average futures prices at planting and at harvest were calculated based on 
the cotton futures data from the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) from 1978 to 2006
5. 
Harvest-time cash price was approximated by the average price received by Georgia producers 
collected by USDA from 1978 to 2005 for cotton
6. Market year average prices from 1978 to 
2005 were obtained from NASS of USDA
7. 
The values of the parameters used in the simulation are listed in table 2 and table 3, while 
basic distributional statistics of the simulated yields and prices are shown in table 4 and table 5. 
The empirical density plots of the simulated county yields and farm yields in figures 3 and figure 
4 show that simulation by applying conditional kernel density method generate farm yields with 
variance conditional on county yields as reflected in the historical yields. 
Results Analysis 
Tables 6 reports the optimal LPM2 hedge ratios and the magnitude of LPM2 risk 
measures under different scenarios for the representative cotton farmer, respectively. Hedge 
ratios hx and hz are the ratios of the hedged yield to the expected yield on a per-acre basis. In the 
base scenario, the crop farmer manages risk with only futures and put options. The availability of 
government payments and federal insurance programs reduce the downside income risk faced by 
crop farmers, as indicated by the decreasing value of LPM2. 
                                                 
4 Speaking more exactly, this is the correlation between detrended county yield and the 
difference of logarithm of futures price at harvest and at planting that will be estimated because 
significant correlation is detected between the two variables for cotton but is not found between 
detrended county yield and futures price at harvest. 
5 Specifically, cotton price of the December futures contract in March and in November were 
averaged, respectively.  
6 Data source: 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1002 
7 Data source: http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/Create_Federal_Indv.jsp   14 
By comparing the hedge ratios in the base case with the hedge ratios with APH in the 
portfolio in addition to futures and options in tables 6, it appears that more futures are sold when 
APH is in the risk management portfolio than when it is not. The result that APH promotes 
hedging demand for futures is consistent with the results of Coble et al. (2000) and Wang et al. 
(2004). However, these works did not consider options as a risk management tool to be used 
together with futures. This study shows that the positive relationship between APH and a futures 
hedge remains when put options are used together with futures as hedging instruments. This 
positive relationship can be intuitively understood in light of the negative correlation between 
harvest-time crop yield and price. Since APH indemnity is triggered when harvest-time crop 
yield drops below the yield guarantee, the lower the yield, the higher is the APH indemnity. In 
other words, APH is more valuable when the crop yield is lower. If the crop price and yield are 
negatively correlated, then APH is more valuable when the harvest price is higher.  
Figure 5 shows that a positive relationship can be fitted between the payoffs of APH and 
cash price. The positive relationship between the value of APH and the crop price implies that 
owing APH is similar to having a long position in futures or call options. Because a long call can 
be replicated by a long position in futures and a long position in put options, when the crop 
farmer has APH insurance, his payoff distribution could be similar to the payoff distribution 
when he has long positions in futures and maybe in put options. Thus, the producer with APH in 
his portfolio would optimally sell more futures and buy fewer put options compared to the 
producer with no APH. The actual effects of APH on the use of put options are not uniform but 
vary with the simulated data. When both futures and put options are in the portfolio, APH shows 
mixed effects on put options. This differs from the results by Coble et al. (2004) that suggested 
APH increases the purchase of put options when the use of futures is excluded.   15 
Results in table 6 suggest that CRC increases selling of futures but decreases hedging in 
put options. The price replacement feature of CRC and the negative correlation between harvest-
time price and yield indicate that the indemnity of CRC is more likely to be triggered when the 
harvest-time crop price is higher than planting-time price. Different from APH, which only 
insures against the risk of low yield, CRC may also pay indemnity when the harvest-time price 
drops so low that the revenue from selling the crop falls below the revenue guarantee in spite of a 
high yield. Since CRC may pay indemnities at both high and low crop prices, the value of CRC 
against cash price might resemble a quadratic curve that opens up. Figure 6 shows that the value 
of CRC on cotton is parabolic in cash price. Thus, the payoff of CRC may be analogous to the 
combination of long position in futures and in put options. As a result, when the crop farmer has 
CRC in his portfolio, he tends to sell more futures and put options than when he has no CRC to 
achieve the optimal minimum LPM2 portfolio. These effects of CRC on futures and options are 
comparable to those found by Coble et al. (2000), who assumed that futures and put options are 
alternative hedging tools. However, the positive effect of CRC on the futures hedge is contrary to 
Mahul (2003) and Wang et al. (2004). Mahul found that CRC decreases hedging in futures 
regardless of whether options are used or not. This divergence could result from the difference in 
the types of portfolio settings modeled, since Mahul used three straddles together with futures, 
while this study examines only the use of put options together with futures. Wang et al. detected 
a negative effect of CRC on futures when they gave no consideration to the use of put options. 
The results of Wang et al. might be biased by the omission of put options from the portfolio. 
Because DP is known at planting, the target payoff in the LPM2 hedge model with DP in 
the portfolio is set as DP py E + ) ( . Since DP increases the actual portfolio income and the target   16 
(expected) portfolio income by the same amount, DP has no demonstrated influence on the 
LPM2 hedge ratios. 
The availability of LDP to the crop farmer appears to slightly increase hedging with 
futures but considerably reduces the purchase of put options. The substitution effect of LDP for 
put options is consistent with the analysis that LDP is an implicit free put option provided to 
farmers. This finding is consistent with the empirical finding of Hanson et al. (1999) from an EU 
hedge model. With LDP in the portfolio, the hedger actually appropriates the value provided by 
LDP by buying fewer put options.  
It is possible that the substitution effect of LDP for put options could be so strong that the 
decision maker shifts from hedging to speculating by means of selling put options. For example, 
in table 6, when LDP is added to the base portfolio, the hedge ratio in put options changes from 
0.26 to  23 . 0 - , and the total percentage of the hedged expected yield changes from 40% to 
negative 8%. This suggests that LDP over protects the crop farmer and converts him from a net 
hedger to a net speculator in futures/put options. The weak substitution effect of LDP for futures 
differs from the results of Coble et al. (2004) and Wang et al. (2004). Neither of these studies 
included put options in the portfolio, and both found that LDP could largely reduce the futures 
hedging positions. 
The effects of CCP are assessed by comparing the hedge ratios from the case (FOD + 
LDP + LCP) with those from the scenario (FOD + LDP). CCP decreases the hedging demand for 
futures and put options. The finding that CCP substitutes futures is consistent with previous 
research by Wang et al. (2004). Anderson et al. (2003) found that CCP is analogous to the 
difference between a put option against the market year average price with a strike price equal to 
the target price minus the direct payment and the value of the other put option against local   17 
market price with a strike equal to the loan rate. In other words, CCP roughly resembles the 
trading strategy to buy one put options with a higher strike price and sell the other put option 
with a lower strike price, since the target price of CCP less the direct payment is higher than the 
loan rate. CCP in cotton data from a Frank copula in Figure 7 further demonstrates that payoffs 
of CCP are analogous to the bear spread strategy in options trading. The downward sloping part 
of CCP against cash price in figure 7 may decrease the hedging use for futures. 
Comparing hedge ratios for cotton from different copulas in table 6, the optimal hedge 
ratios for cotton data simulated from two different copula assumptions are different, even though 
they are computed based on the same historical data. This suggests that the assumed joint 
distribution (or, equivalently, copula function) is an important factor affecting the optimal hedge 
ratios. However, as far as effects of government payments and crop insurance plans on the 
optimal hedge ratios are concerned, the results are consistent across the different copula 
functions. Thus, although the exact hedge ratios may not be used to guide actual hedging practice, 
the effects detected by this study provide valuable information for both crop farmers and policy 
makers.  
In addition to disclosing the effects of government payments or crop insurance on use of 
futures and options, the results in tables 6 suggest that CRC is more efficient than APH for 
downside risk reduction. Including CCP decreases risk more than LDP. CRC has the largest 
downside risk reduction effects among the four government income support programs. Hence, if 
there is budget competition among the programs, CRC should be given the highest priority 
among the four government payments and federal insurance programs discussed. Conversely, 
APH is the least competitive of the four programs in terms of downside risk reduction.   18 
The impacts of perceived bias in futures prices on optimal LPM2 hedging are next 
examined for the base scenario. Table 7 reports the optimal hedge ratios with and without futures 
price bias. The scenario of zero percent bias means no futures price bias; that is,  1 0 Ef f = . 
Negative bias means that the futures price at planting is lower than the expected futures price at 
harvest; i.e. 1 0 Ef f < . If the futures bias is assumed to be -2%, then  %) 2 % 100 /( 0 1 - = f Ef . On 
the contrary, positive bias means that the futures price at planting is higher than the expected 
futures price at harvest; i.e. 1 0 Ef f > . Positive-biased futures prices are simulated by following 
the same method as for negative bias. 
As expected, the negative bias of the planting time futures price suppresses the hedging 
demand for futures and could even convert the hedger to a speculator in the futures market. In 
contrast, a positive bias in the futures price induces more use of the futures hedge. The 
substitution effect between futures and put options may be caused by the assumption that put 
options are fairly priced, although futures prices are biased.  
Conclusions and Implications 
This study finds that the inclusion of government programs and federal crop insurance in 
the hedging portfolio always reduces the downside income risk faced by crop farmers. The 
effects of crop insurance and government payments on the use of futures and options can be 
evaluated by comparing the optimal hedge ratios in various scenarios with the base scenario. In 
summary, APH has a positive effect on futures hedge, regardless of the use of put options. The 
CRC revenue insurance policy consistently increases the hedging position in futures but 
decreases the hedging position in put options. Direct payments have no effects on the LPM2 
hedge ratios, because it increases both the actual farm income and the expected income by the 
same amount. The availability of LDP to the crop farmer marginally increases the hedge ratio in   19 
futures but considerably reduces the purchase of put options. CCP unequally decreases the 
hedging demand for futures and put options. Perceived biases in the seasonal futures prices are 
shown to have substantial effects on the hedging demand for futures. A lower (higher) futures 
price at planting compared to the expectation of the futures price at harvest decreases (increases) 
the hedge ratios in futures. 
Possible extensions to this study can be made in several directions. First, this study has 
not allowed crop farmers to decide whether to buy insurance or not. Future research could 
investigate the interactions of futures, options and insurance by allowing the producer to 
determine his/her positions jointly over all the feasible risk management tools. Second, this study 
calculates the payoffs of government payments according to the parameter values in the current 
farm bill. The effects of changes in the parameter values of the government payments on hedging 
could be investigated to gain a better understanding of the relationships between government 
payments and the use of futures and options. This study used actuarially fair premiums for the 
crop insurance rather than the actual premiums charged by these insurance plans. To use the 
actual premiums better represent the real portfolio risk management problem faced by crop 
farmers. Only the effects of government payments and crop insurance on cotton’s hedge are 
evaluated by this study. The same methodology can be extended to other crops to examine the 
consistency of these effects across crops.  
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Table 1 Normality Tests of dlnf for Cotton Futures 1978-2005 
Normality test  Distribution   Test statistic  P-value 
Shapiro-Wilk                W  0.9533     0.240 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov    D  0.1268    0.150 
Cramer-von Mises        W-Sq    0.0646  0.250 
Anderson-Darling        A-Sq    0.4448    0.250 
f d ln ˆ m   -0.025  f d ln ˆ s   0.174 
 
Note:   dlnf  = lnf1-lnf0,  f0 and f1are the March and November daily average of the futures prices 




Table 2 Summary of Parameters in APH, CRC, DP, LDP, and CCP 
Crop  Cotton 
1 (Colquitt, GA) 
Coverage level d   70% 
APH yield 
APH y   768 (lb) 
APH price pAPH  $0.53/lb 
CRC price fCRC0  $0.60/lb 




  $0.0667/lb 
Loan rate pLDP
2
  $0.52/lb 
CCP target pCCP
3
  $0.724/lb 
 
Note :  
1 Rates listed are for the upland cotton of a specific grade.  
(http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/printapp?fileName=pf_20060301_insup_en_cottdcp06.ht
ml&newsType=prfactsheet) 
2  http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=prsu&topic=lor 
3 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/programprovisions.htm 
4 Average of the county yields from 1981 through 1985. 
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Table 3 Estimated Parameters for Simulating Cotton County Yields and Prices  
Parameters in Simulation  Coefficient Estimation  P-value 
) (r S r   -0.331(-0.345)  0.0852 
q   -1.353  0.0197 
b0_p  9.420  0.0330 
b1_p  0.795  <.0001 
Residual s _p  4.088   
b0_MYA  8.286  0.0635 
b1_MYA  0.798  <.0001 
Residual s _MYA  4.177   
 
Note:    S r is the Spearman correlation used to calculate Pearson correlation coefficient  r  in the 
Gaussian copula simulation. 
q  is the parameter in the Frank copula. 
p is simulated based on the linear regression  
 p = b0_p + b1_pf1 + e1, e1~Normal (0, s _p).     
pMYA is simulated based on linear regression  






Table 4 Gaussian Copula: Basic Statistics of the Simulated Cotton Yields and Prices 











Mean  848  848  58.52      55.88      54.99 
Std Dev  143.94  —  10.15  9.01  9.11 
Skewness  -0.001      —  0.568      0.416      0.434     
Kurtosis  -1.035  —  0.715  0.436  0.498 
Min  566  8  26.18  29.98  26.91 
Q1
  716  668  51.40  49.57  48.68 
Q3
  966  1040  64.61  61.50  60.72 
Max  1142  1726  110.15  100.04  101.51 
 
Note:   Variance, skewness and kurtosis of farm yield are not listed because farm yield 
distribution is contingent on the level of county yield; PMYA is the market year average 
price; Q1, Q3 are 25% and 75% quantile, respectively. 
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Table 5 Frank Copula: Basic Statistics of the Simulated Cotton Yields and Prices  
Statistics  County Yield 
(lb.) 









Mean  850   850     58.52      55.88      54.99     
Std Dev  143.89  —  10.24  9.11  9.17 
Skewness  -0.029      —  0.528     0.355      0.389     
Kurtosis  -1.040  —  0.473  0.306  0.362 
Min  569  1  25.87  23.37  25.68 
Q1  717  669  51.24  49.67  48.74 
Q3  967  1047  64.78  61.63  60.59 
Max  1142  1729  110.61  98.24  100.50 
 
Note:   Variance, skewness and kurtosis of farm yield are not listed, because farm yield 
distribution is contingent on the level of county yield; PMYA is the market year average 
price; Q1, Q3 are 25% and 75% quantile, respectively. 
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Table 6 Optimal LPM2 Hedge Ratios under Different Scenarios for Cotton 
Cotton Gaussian Copula  Cotton Frank Copula 
Scenarios 
hx (chg
1)  hz (chg
1)  LPM2  hx (chg
1)  hz (chg
1)  LPM2 
Futures + Options (FO)  0.14  0.26  12938.40  0.32  0.16  13050.90 
FO + APH  0.27 (0.13)  0.17 (-0.09)  8581.96  0.40 (0.08)  0.13 (-0.03)  8728.21 
FO + CRC  0.38 (0.24)  -0.10 (-0.36)  7359.03  0.49 (0.17)  -0.14 (-0.30)  7496.41 
Futures + Options + DP (FOD)
2  0.14  0.26  12938.40  0.32  0.16  13050.90 
FOD + LDP  0.15 (0.01)  -0.23 (-0.49)  11524.61  0.33 (0.01)  -0.33 (-0.49)  11608.38 
FOD + LDP + CCP
1  -0.34 (-.48)  -0.02 (0.21)  5961.11  -0.19 (-0.52)   -0.09 (0.24)  6045.10 
Note:   Mean, Min, Max are values in dollars on a per acre basis. hx, hz are hedge ratios in futures and put options, respectively.  
Positive hx means sell futures at planting time and positive hz means buy put options at planting time.  
1 Numbers in parenthesis are changes in hedge ratios compared to the scenario (FOD+LDP). 
2 hx, hz are the same as in the case of FO because the target payoff for FOD is increased by the value of DP compared to the 
target payoff in the FO case. Since DP is known at planting time, it is reasonable to make such adjustment to the target payoff. 
 
 
Table 7 Optimal LPM2 Hedge Ratios for Biased Futures Markets 
  Cotton  Gaussian Copula    Cotton Frank Copula   
Bias 
  hx  hz    hx  hz   
Futures+Options   
-2%    -0.23  0.69    -0.32  1.13   
-1%    -0.16  0.70    0.03  0.63   
0    0.14  0.26    0.32  0.16   
1%    0.44  -0.18    0.62  -0.29   
2%    0.52  -0.18    0.93  -0.73   
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Figure 2 Simulation Flowchart 
 
Note:  yc is the simulated county yield; yf is the farm yield; f1 is futures price; p is the cash price; 
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Figure 5 Positive Relationships between the Value of APH and Cash Price in the Simulated 
Cotton Data (Frank Copula). 
vaph = -15.371 +27.506cash
N     
10000 
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Note:   the slope of the fitted line has P-value <0.0001. 
Figure 6 Quadratic Relationships between the Value of CRC and Cash Price in the Simulated 










0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
 
Note:    All three parameters of the fitted quadratic curve have P-value < 0.0001.   30 
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Appendix I 
The hedge portfolio including APH plan is  
) ( ] ) 0 , [max( ) ( 1 1 0 Ey C NV Ey v k f h Ey f f h py APH Z Z X APH - + - - + - + = p   
where  APH APH APH APH v y y p NV - - ￿ = ) 0 , max(d . The  APH y  is the APH yield of the representative 
farmer, d is the coverage level, and  APH p  is the indemnity price. The actuarial fair premium is 
used, which is obtained by setting  )) 0 , max( ( y y p E v APH APH APH - ￿ = d . 
The payoff of the hedge portfolio including CRC is 
) ( ] ) 0 , [max( ) ( 1 1 0 Ey C NV Ey v k f h Ey f f h py CRC Z Z X CRC - + - - + - + = p  
with  CRC APH CRC CRC v y f y f f NV - - = )] 0 , ) , max( max[ 1 1 0 d  and 
)]) 0 , ) , max( (max[ 1 1 0 y f y f f E v APH CRC CRC CRC - = d  
The portfolio with futures, options and DP has payoffs as 
) ( ] ) 0 , [max( ) ( 1 1 0 Ey C DP Ey v k f h Ey f f h py Z Z X - + - - + - + = p  
with  DP DP y p DP ￿ = , which is already known at the planting time.  DP p  and  DP y  are the direct 
payment rate and the base yield fixed from 2002 through 2007. 
The representative farmer’s portfolio, including DP and LDP, is 
) ( ] ) 0 , [max( ) ( 1 1 0 Ey C LDP DP Ey v k f h Ey f f h py Z Z X LDP - + + - - + - + = p  
where  y p p LDP LDP ￿ - = ) 0 , max( ,   LDP p  is the loan rate. 
  The portfolio including DP, LDP and CCP is  
) ( ] ) 0 , [max( ) ( 1 1 0 Ey C CCP LDP DP Ey v k f h Ey f f h py Z Z X CCP - + + + - - + - + = p  
where  DP LDP MYA DP CCP y p p p p CCP ￿ - - = ] 0 ), , max( max[ ,  CCP p is the target price of CCP and 
MYA p  is the market year average price.  